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Abstract
Reliable broadcast is an important primitive to ensure that a source
node can reliably disseminate a message to all the non-faulty nodes in
an asynchronous and failure-prone networked system. Byzantine Reliable
Broadcast protocols were first proposed by Bracha in 1987, and have been
widely used in fault-tolerant systems and protocols. Several recent proto-
cols have improved the round and bit complexity of these algorithms.
Motivated by the constraints in practical networks, we revisit the prob-
lem. In particular, we use cryptographic hash functions and erasure coding
to reduce communication and computation complexity and simplify the
protocol design. We also identify the fundamental trade-offs of Byzantine
Reliable Broadcast protocols with respect to resilience (number of nodes),
local computation, round complexity, and bit complexity.
Finally, we also design and implement a general testing framework
for similar communication protocols. We evaluate our protocols using
our framework. The results demonstrate that our protocols have superior
performance in practical networks.
1 Introduction
We consider the reliable broadcast (RB) problem in an asynchronous message-
passing system of n nodes. Intuitively, the RB abstraction ensures that no two
non-faulty nodes deliver different messages reliably broadcast by a source (or
sender), either all non-faulty nodes deliver a message or none does, and that,
if the source is non-faulty, all non-faulty nodes eventually deliver the broadcast
message. Several fault-tolerant distributed applications [15, 2, 9] require com-
munication with provable guarantees on message deliveries (e.g., all-or-nothing
property, eventual delivery property, etc.). Since Bracha’s seminal work in 1987
[8], many Byzantine-tolerant RB (or simply Byzantine RB) protocols have been
proposed, which improve metrics including bit complexity and round complex-
ity. These results are summarized in Table 1. Here, we assume a message is of
L bits in size. For a detailed study of the related work please refer to Section 8.
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To the best of our knowledge, none of the prior works have studied and
evaluated the reliable broadcast (RB) protocols in a practical setting assuming
reasonable local computation power and finite bandwidth. Toward this ends,
we identify fundamental trade-offs, and use cryptographic hash functions [4] and
erasure coding [21] to design more efficient algorithms. We also build a general
evaluation tool on top of Mininet [26, 20] to conduct a comprehensive evaluation
under practical constraints. One goal of this paper is to provide guidance and
reference for practitioners that work on fault-tolerant distributed systems. In
particular, our results shed light on the following two questions:
• Does there exist an RB protocol that achieves optimality in all four main
metrics – bit complexity, round complexity, computation complexity and
resilience?
• What is the performance of RB protocols in a realistic network?
Motivation
This work is motivated by the following observations when we tried to apply
fault-tolerant RB protocols in practice:
• Existing reliable broadcast mechanisms are not efficient in terms of band-
width usage and/or computation. (See Table 1)
• Most RB protocols [8, 6, 10] assume unlimited bandwidth, and use flooding-
based algorithms that send unnecessary redundant messages.
• RB and Byzantine consensus protocols (e.g., [27], [35], [32]) that are
proved to have optimal bit complexity usually have high round complexity
and local computation.
• Theoretically speaking, if a protocol relies on a cryptographic hash func-
tion [36] to ensure correctness, then it is not always error-free, since it
assumes that the adversary has limited computational power. However,
we think this is acceptable in practical systems as many real-world systems
use cryptographic hash functions, e.g., Bitcoin [31].
• In many scenarios, the source may not reside in the system, and the band-
width between the source and other nodes is usually more limited com-
pared to bandwidth between two non-source nodes. For example, source
could be a client or client proxy for a distributed storage system, and
communicate with other nodes through Internet and non-source nodes
communicate through highly optimized datacenter network.
Main Contributions
Motivated by our observations, we propose a family of algorithms that use hash
function and erasure coding to reduce bit, round, and computation complexity.
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• EC-CRB : Crash-tolerant erasure coding-based RB (Sec. 3)
• H-BRB : Hash-based Byzantine-tolerant RB (Sec. 4)
• EC-BRB : Byzantine-tolerant erasure coding-based RB (Sec. 5)
Table 1 provides a summary of our results and compares our results to prior
work. Our EC-based protocols use [n, k] MDS erasure codes. Please refer to
Section 5.1 for a preliminary on MDS codes.
Our Byzantine RB’s bit complexity is listed as O(nL + nfL), because in
cases when the source is non-faulty and the delay is small, the complexity is
O(nL). Only in unfortunate scenarios where the source equivocates, or some
messages are lost, our protocols need to perform a recovery mechanism which
incurs O(fL) extra bits per node. We believe our protocols are appropriate in
practice, as most systems assume small f . Our EC-based protocols have another
advantage over other protocols; the bandwidth consumption between the source
and other nodes is only O(nL/k).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our mod-
els, notations and problem specification. In Sections 4 and 5, we present our
main algorithmic results on Byzantine RB protocols. In Section 6, we present
two impossibility results proving the optimality of our algorithms (in certain
aspects). These impossibilities together also imply that there is no RB protocol
that achieves optimality in all four main metrics. Our benchmark framework,
Reliability-Mininet-Benchmark (RMB), and evaluation results are detailed in
Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model and Notations
We consider a static asynchronous message-passing system composed of a fully
connected network of n nodes, where up to f nodes may be Byzantine faulty.
Network Nodes are sequential and fully connected by reliable and authen-
ticated point-to-point channels in an asynchronous network. “Asynchronous”
means that nodes do not have access to a global clock (or wall-clock time), and
each node proceeds at its own speed, which can vary arbitrarily with real time.
Reliable channel ensures that (i) the network cannot drop a message if both
sender and receiver are non-faulty, and (ii) a non-faulty node receives a message
if and only if another node sent the message. Authentication ensures that the
sender of each message can be uniquely identified and a faulty node cannot send
a message with a fake identity (as another node) [30, 37].
In an asynchronous network, there is no known upper bound on the message
delay. However, a message sent by a non-faulty node to another non-faulty node
will eventually be delivered due to the reliability channel assumption. When we
say a node sends a message to all nodes, we assume that it also sends to itself.
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Algorithm
Bit
complexity
System Size
(Resilience)
Round
Complexity
Error
-free
Uses
MDS
codes
Bottleneck
CRB [37] O(n2L) ≥ f + 1 1 Yes No -
EC-CRB O(n2L/k) ≥ f + 1 2 Yes Yes MDS code
Bracha RB [8] O(n2L) ≥ 3f + 1 3 Yes No Flooding
Raynal RB [23] O(n2L) ≥ 3f + 1 2 Yes No Flooding
Patra RB [35] O(nL) ≥ 3f + 1 9 Yes Yes
Polynomial time
local computation
with large constants
Nayak et al.[32] O(nL) ≥ 3f + 1 10 Yes Yes
Polynomial time
local computation
with large constants
H-BRB[3f+1] O(nL) + O(nfL) ≥ 3f + 1 3 No No Hash Function
H-BRB[5f+1] O(nL) + O(nfL) ≥ 5f + 1 2 No No Hash Function
EC-BRB[3f+1] O(nL) + O(nfL) ≥ 3f + 1 3 No Yes Hash Function
+ MDS code
EC-BRB[4f+1] O(nL) + O(nfL) ≥ 4f + 1 3 No Yes Hash Function
+ MDS code
Table 1:
Summary of our contributions and a comparison with previous work
Note that this is achieved by performing multiple unicasts; hence, there is no
guarantee on the delivery if the sender is faulty.
Fault Model A Byzantine node is a node that behaves arbitrarily: it may
crash, fail to send or receive messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform
arbitrary state transitions, etc. A Byzantine node may have the power to equiv-
ocate, i.e., send arbitrary messages to different sets of nodes. For example, when
a Byzantine source node, s sends a message, m to all the nodes, it can equiv-
ocate and send a message m1 to some nodes, a different message m2 to some
other nodes, and no message at all to the other nodes. A node that exhibits
a Byzantine behavior is also called faulty. Otherwise, it is non-faulty. In our
model, up to f nodes can exhibit Byzantine behavior.
Notations Every message m sent by a non-faulty source s is associated with a
sequence number or index h. Thus m can be uniquely indexed through a tuple
(s, h) in the system due to the message authentication assumption discussed
above. For example, in the distributed data store context, h could be the key
of the message or a sequence number associated with the message.
In all of our algorithms, we use MsgSeti[s, h] to denote the set of messages
that the node i collects, in which are candidates that can be identified with
(s, h). When the context is clear, we omit the subscript i. We use Counter[∗]
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Figure 1: The reliable broadcast abstraction at a single node
to denote a local counter of certain type of messages that is initialized to 0. We
use H(∗) to denote the cryptographic hash function.
2.2 Properties of Reliable Broadcast
We adopt reliable broadcast properties from [1, 8, 22]. Each node consists
of three layers: network, middleware (RB protocols), and application layers
depicted in Figure 1 (adapted from [37]). The protocol at the source s calls
“Reliable-Broadcast(m,h)” to broadcast a message m with sequence number h
reliably. Then, the middleware layer executes the RB protocol by exchanging
messages with other nodes. For each non-faulty node, upon receiving enough
messages of a certain type, the RB protocol would tell the application layer it
can “Reliable-Accept(m′, h)”.
A reliable broadcast (RB) protocol is said to be correct if it satisfies the
following five properties.
Property 1 (Non-faulty Broadcast Termination). If a non-faulty source s per-
forms Reliable-Broadcast(m,h), with a message m having index h then all non-
faulty nodes will eventually Reliable-Accept(s,m, h).
Property 2 (Validity). If a non-faulty source s does not perform Reliable-
Broadcast(m,h) then no non-faulty node will ever perform Reliable-Accept(s,m, h).
Property 3 (Agreement). If a non-faulty node performs Reliable-Accept(s,m, h)
and another non-faulty node will eventually perform Reliable-Accept(s,m′, h)
then m = m′.
Property 4 (Integrity). A non-faulty node reliably accepts at most one message
of index h from a source s.
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Property 5 (Eventual Termination). If a non-faulty node performs Reliable-
Accept(s,m, h), then all non-faulty nodes eventually perform Reliable-Accept(s,m, h).
Note that if the source is faulty, then it is possible that no non-faulty node
would ever reliably accept its message. This is the main different between
Byzantine RB problem, and Byzantine broadcast (or agreement) problem in
the synchronous systems [25, 30, 37]. In the Byzantine broadcast problem, each
non-faulty node has to output a value, whether the source is faulty or not.
3 Erasure Coding-based Crash-tolerant RB
In this section, we present a simple idea that augments the original crash-
tolerant reliable broadcast (CRB) [30] with erasure coding. The new protocol
is named EC-CRB.
3.1 EC-CRB: Algorithm
We present our algorithms here. EC-CRB will use [n, k] MDS code. Source’s
logic is simple and its code is presented in Algorithm 1. To send a message
m with sequence number h, it encodes the message m and then disseminates
to each peer. The message is a tuple that contains the tag MSG, the source
identifier s, corresponding coded element, and sequence number of the message
h.
To deal with asynchrony and failures, our algorithm is event-driven, similar
to prior algorithms [8, 37]. The pseudo-code for peers and the source when
receiving a message from the sender j is presented in Algorithm 2. First, upon
receiving a coded element from the source, node i forwards an ECHO message
along with the coded element. Second, upon receiving an ECHO message, node
i decodes the message if it has received enough number of coded elements.
The key design behind how crash-tolerant RB achieves the all-or-nothing
property is that each peer needs to (pessimistically) help deliver the message to
other peers. EC-CRB achieves this at Line 9 in Algorithm 2. There are several
designs that affect the complexity.
Algorithm 1 EC-CRB: source s with message m of index h
1: function Reliable-Broadcast(m,h)
2: {c1, c2, . . . , cn} ← ENC(m) . Encoding message
3: for each i do
4: Send(MSG, s, ci, h) to node i
3.2 EC-CRB: Correctness and Complexity
It is not difficult to see that EC-CRB is correct as long as k ≥ n − f , since a
node needs to have at least k coded elements to correctly recover the original
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Algorithm 2 EC-CRB: all node i (including s) when receiving a message from
sender j
1: function Receiving(MSG, s, c, h)
2: Send(ECHO, s, c, h) to all nodes
3: CodeSet[s, h]← CodeSet[s, h] ∪ {c}
4: function Receiving(ECHO, s, c, h)
5: CodeSet[s, h]← CodeSet[s, h] ∪ {c}
6: if |CodeSet[s, h]| ≥ k for the first time then
7: m← DEC(CodeSet[s, h]) . Decoding
8: Reliable-Accept(s,m, h)
9: Send (ACC, s,m, h) to all peers
message, and in our model, a node can wait up to n − f ECHO messages. As
mentioned above, agreement property is achieved due to Line 9 in Algorithm 2.
The message complexity is O(n2). The round complexity is 2. The bit
complexity is O(n
2L
k ). For large enough k, the bit complexity becomes O(nL).
4 Hash-based Byzantine RB
Crash-tolerant RB has been well-studied [30, 37]. For completeness, we present
an erasure coding-based crash-tolerant RB (EC-CRB). This section focuses on
Hash-based Byzantine-tolerant Reliable Broadcast (H-BRB) protocols. In par-
ticularly, we present H-BRB[3f+1] which uses a cryptographic hash function
to reduce communication complexity. The name contains“3f+1”, because this
protocol requires the system size n ≥ 3f + 1 for correctness. We also present
the intuition of H-BRB[5f+1], which is correct if n ≥ 5f + 1. Compared to
H-BRB[3f+1], it requires less number of rounds and messages.
Byzantine Reliable Broadcast: Challenges
We begin with the discussion on the difficulty of implementing a Byzantine RB
protocol, and why most prior algorithms are not practical due to prohibitively
high bandwidth consumption. A Byzantine faulty node has a great deal of
adversarial power. For example, it can equivocate and send out contradicting
messages to different sets of nodes in the system. These nodes may collude to
create a chain of misinformation and thus no information unless verified by at
least f + 1 nodes may be fully trusted.
There are asymptotically tight algorithms in terms of either bit complexity
or resilience or round complexity in the literature. Unfortunately many of them
have high local computation [34, 35] and a large bandwidth consumption due
to flooding of messages [8, 23], which can be detrimental to practical networks
with limited bandwidth.
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Cryptographic Hash Function
All of our algorithms utilize an ideal cryptographic hash function. In partic-
ular, the correctness of our algorithms rely on the collision-resistant property
of the hash function used. From a theoretical point of view, our algorithms
are not error-free, as the adversary cannot have unlimited computation power.
As discussed earlier, cryptographic hash functions are used widely in real-world
applications. We believe it is reasonable to adopt this technique in designing
more practical RB protocols.
Every node runs the same hash function. A good pick for such a function
would accelerate the hash computation and henceforth accelerate the reliable
broadcast process. By convention, the output of a hash function is of constant
size. Though SHA-2 and SHA-3 families of hash functions cannot be proven
with these properties, they can be used in the practical sense.
4.1 H-BRB[3f+1]
H-BRB[3f+1]: Algorithm
Algorithm 3 H-BRB[3f+1]: source s with message m of index h
1: function Reliable-Broadcast(m,h)
2: Send(MSG, s,m, h) to all nodes
The pseudo-code of H-BRB[3f+1] is presented in Algorithms 3, 4, and 5.
In Algorithm 3, the source node simply sends a MSG message containing its
identifier, message content m, and the sequence number h, to all the nodes.
Following the convention, we assume that the source also sends the message to
itself.
Algorithm 4 specified how all the nodes (including s) process incoming mes-
sages. Each node may receive five types of messages:
• MSG message: this must come directly from the source which contains
the message content m. If the source identifier does not match the sender
identifier, then the message is discarded.
• A helper(m) message is a constant sized message created from some arbi-
trary function f(m). In our algorithms, the function H is used to create
helper messages. The helper messages used in our algorithms are ECHO,
ACC and REQ messages:
– ECHO message: this message propagates information about a mes-
sage already received by some node. In [8, 37], ECHO messages
contain the full content m. In our hash based algorithms, we only
transmit H(m). This is the main reason that we are able to reduce
bit complexity.
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Algorithm 4 H-BRB[3f+1]: all node i (including s) when receiving a message
from node j
1: function Receiving(MSG, s,m, h)
2: if j = s and first (MSG, s, ∗, h) then
3: MsgSet[s, h]← MsgSet[s, h] ∪ {m}
4: Counter[ECHO, s,H(m), h] + +
5: if never sent (ECHO, s, ∗, h) then
6: Send (ECHO, s,H(m), h) to all nodes
7: function Receiving(ECHO, s,H, h)
8: if first (ECHO, s, ∗, h) from j then
9: Counter[ECHO, s,H, h] + +
10: Check(s,H, h)
11: function Receiving(ACC, s,H, h)
12: if first (ACC, s, ∗, h) from j then
13: Counter[ACC, s,H, h] + +
14: if Counter[ACC, s,H, h] = f + 1 then
15: if 6 ∃m′ ∈ MsgSet[s, h] s.t. H(m′) = H then
16: Send (REQ, s,H, h) to these f + 1 nodes
17: Check(j,H, h)
18: function Receiving(REQ, s,H, h)
19: if first (REQ, s, h) from j then
20: if ∃m′ ∈ MsgSet[s, h] s.t. H(m′) = H then
21: Send (FWD, s,m′, h) to j
22: function Receiving(FWD, s,m, h)
23: if have sent (REQ, s,H(m), h) to j then
24: if first (FWD, s,m, h) from j then
25: MsgSet[s, h]← MsgSet[s, h] ∪ {m}
26: Check(s,H(m), h)
– ACC message: similar to [8], this message is used to declare to other
nodes when a some node is ready to accept a message m. Again,
instead of sending m with the ACC message, we send H(m).
– REQ messages: In our hash based approach, a node might not
know the original message m, even after it has observed enough
ACC(m) messages supporting it. Therefore, such a node needs to
use REQ(H(m)) message to fetch the original message content from
some non faulty node before accepting it.
• FWD messages: When a node is sent a REQ(H(m)) message, it replies
with a FWD(m) message, that contains the original message content of
m.
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Algorithm 5 H-BRB[3f+1]: helper function for all node i (including s)
1: function Check(s,H, h)
2: if m ∈ MsgSet[s, h] s.t. H(m) = H then
3: if Counter[ECHO, s,H, h] ≥ f + 1 then
4: if never sent (ECHO, s, ∗, h) then
5: Send (ECHO, s,H, h) to all nodes
6: if Counter[ECHO, s,H, h] ≥ n− f then
7: if never sent (ACC, s, ∗, h) then
8: Send (ACC, s,H, h) to all nodes
9: if Counter[ACC, s,H, h] ≥ f + 1 then
10: if never sent (ACC, s, ∗, h) then
11: Send (ACC, s,H, h) to all nodes
12: if Counter[ACC, s,H, h] ≥ n− f then
13: Reliable-Accept(s,m, h)
Correctness of H-BRB[3f+1]
Theorem 6. H-BRB[3f+1] satisfies Property 1-5 given that n ≥ 3f + 1.
We begin the proof with three important lemmas. The first two follow di-
rectly from the reliable and authenticated channel assumption and the thresh-
olds we used.
Lemma 7. If a non-faulty source s performs Reliable-Broadcast(m,h), then
MsgSeti[s, h] ⊆ {m} at each non-faulty node i.
Lemma 8. If a non-faulty node s never performs Reliable-Broadcast (m,h),
then MsgSeti[s, h] = ∅ at each non-faulty node i.
Lemma 9. If two non-faulty nodes i and j send (ACC, s,H(m), h) and (ACC, s,H(m′), h)
messages, respectively, then m = m′.
Proof. Suppose, for the purpose of contradiction, m 6= m′. WLOG, let i be the
first node that sends (ACC, s,H(m), h), and let j be the first node that sends
(ACC, s,H(m′), h). Note that by construction, they are only able to send an
ACC message when either line 7 or line 10 of Algorithm 5 is satisfied. Since
we assume i is the first node that sends ACC message in support of m, line 10
of Algorithm 5 could not be satisfied. Therefore, i must have received at least
n− f ECHO messages supporting H(m), out of which n− f − f ≥ f + 1 ECHO
messages are from non-faulty nodes. Thus, at most f faulty nodes and at most
f non-faulty nodes would send H(m′)
Now consider the case of node j. Since j has received at least n− f ECHO
messages supporting H(m′), following the same rationale as above, at least
f + 1 ECHO messages are from non-faulty nodes. This however leads to a
contradiction, since the algorithm does not permit non-faulty nodes to send
ECHO messages supporting both H(m) and H(m′).
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Property 1-4 follow directly from the three lemmas above. Below, we prove
the most interesting one, Property 5 (Eventual Termination).
Lemma 10. H-BRB[3f+1] satisfies Property 5 (Eventual Termination) if n ≥
3f + 1.
Proof. If a non-faulty node i reliably accepts a message m, then predicates
at line 2 and at line 13 of Algorithm 5 are satisfied, which means i has the
message content m (either directly from the source or a forwarded message)
and i has gathered at least n− f ACC messages. Out of these ACC messages,
at most f come from Byzantine nodes, and thus node i has received at least
n− f − f ≥ f + 1, ACC messages from non-faulty nodes.
By our assumption that all messages sent by non faulty nodes eventually
reach non faulty nodes, at least f+1 ACC messages will eventually be delivered
at all the other non-faulty nodes, and thus a non-faulty node can always receive
some message broadcast by (possibly faulty) node s since line 14 of Algorithm 4
will be triggered.
Line 2 of Algorithm 5 is satisfied once a non-faulty node acquires the original
message and line 10 of Algorithm 5 is satisfied when a node has f + 1, ACC
messages. Once this happens, by Lemma 9, each of the n− f non-faulty nodes
will send out the correct ACC(H(m)) message to all the other nodes. Thus,
eventually ≥ n− f ACC messages supporting m will eventually be delivered to
all the other non-faulty nodes, and the predicate on line 13 of Algorithm 5 will
be satisfied, and m will be reliably delivered.
4.2 H-BRB[5f+1]
Inspired by a recent paper [23] that sacrifices resilience for lower message and
round complexity, we adapt H-BRB[3f+1] in a similar way. Particularly, we can
get rid of the ACC messages. By increasing number of servers, we are able to
guarantee that after receiving ≥ n − f , ECHO messages, a node can reliably
accept a message if n ≥ 5f + 1. Intuitively speaking, this guarantees that at
least n−2f ≥ 3f +1 non-faulty nodes have received the same message (or more
precisely the same H(m)), which is guaranteed to be a quorum that prevents
other nodes to collect enough ECHO messages.
The pseudo-code of H-BRB[5f+1] is presented in Algorithm 3, 6, and 7. Note
that the source code is the same as H-BRB[3f+1]. Correctness proof is similar
to the ones in [22].
Our H-BRB[5f+1] protocol completes in 2 rounds of communication among
the nodes which is one round of communication less compared to other protocols
as proved in Theorem 19 in Section 6.
5 EC-based Byzantine RB
One drawback of the H-BRB is that the bit complexity or message size is still
high. Especially, the source still needs to send O(nL) bits. One standard trick
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Algorithm 6 H-BRB[5f+1]: all node i (including s) when receiving a message
from node j
1: function Receiving(MSG, s,m, h)
2: if j = s and first (MSG, s, ∗, h) then
3: MsgSet[s, h]← MsgSet[s, h] ∪ {m}
4: Counter[ECHO, s,H(m), h] + +
5: if never sent (ECHO, s, ∗, h) then
6: Send (ECHO, s,H(m), h) to all nodes
7: function Receiving(ECHO, s,H, h)
8: if first (ECHO, s, ∗, h) from j then
9: Counter[ECHO, s,H, h] + +
10: if Counter[ECHO, s,H, h] = f + 1 then
11: if 6 ∃m ∈ MsgSet[s, h] s.t. H(m) = H then
12: Send (REQ, s,H(m), h) to these f + 1 nodes
13: Check(s,H, h)
14: function Receiving(REQ, s,H, h)
15: if first (REQ, s, h) from j then
16: if ∃m′ ∈ MsgSet[s, h] s.t. H(m′) = H then
17: Send (FWD, s,m′, h) to j
18: function Receiving(FWD, s,m, h)
19: if have sent (REQ, s,H(m), h) to j then
20: if first (FWD, s,m, h) from j then
21: MsgSet[s, h]← MsgSet[s, h] ∪ {m}
22: Check(s,H(m), h)
is to use erasure coding [21] to reduce the message size. We present two ideas in
this section. The key difference between our protocols and prior EC-based RB
protocol [34] and our hash-based protocols is that these algorithms require the
source to send its original message to all other nodes, whereas in our EC-based
protocols, the source sends a small coded element.
5.1 MDS Erasure Code: Preliminaries
For completeness, we first discuss basic concepts and notations from coding
theory. We use a linear [n, k] MDS (Maximum Distance Separable) erasure
code [21] over a finite field Fq to encode the message m. An [n, k] MDS erasure
code has the property that any k out of the n coded elements, computed by
encoding m, can be used to recover (decode) the original message m.
For encoding, m is divided into k elements m1,m2, . . . ,mk with each element
having size L/k (assuming size of m is L). The encoder takes the k elements as
input and produces n coded elements c1, c2, . . . , cn as output, i.e.,
[c1, . . . , cn] = ENC([m1, . . . ,mk]),
12
Algorithm 7 H-BRB[5f+1]: helper function for all node i (including s)
1: function Check(s,H, h)
2: if m ∈ MsgSet[s, h] s.t. H(m) = H then
3: if Counter[ECHO, s,H, h] ≥ n− 2f then
4: if never sent (ECHO, s, ∗, h) then
5: Send (ECHO, s,H, h) to all nodes
6: if Counter[ECHO, s,H, h] ≥ n− f then
7: Reliable-Accept(s,m, h)
where ENC denotes the encoder. For brevity, we simply use ENC(m) to
represent [c1, . . . , cn].
The vector [c1, . . . , cn] is referred to as the codeword corresponding to the
message m. Each coded element ci also has size
L
k .
In our algorithm, the source disseminates one coded element to each node.
We use ENCi to denote the projection of ENC on to the i
th output component,
i.e., ci = ENCi(v). Without loss of generality, we associate the coded element
ci with node i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
5.2 EC-BRB[3f+1]
Our first idea is to adapt H-BRB[3f+1] so that each node i not only forwards
H(m), but also a coded element ci. This reduces bit complexity. We use [n, f+1]
MDS erasure code, and do not use detection or correction capability. In other
words, the decoder function DEC can correctly decode the original message if
the input contains at least f + 1 uncorrupted coded elements. We do not need
the correction/detection, because a node can use H(m) to verify whether the
decoded message is the intended one or not.
The pseudo-code of EC-BRB[3f+1] is presented in Algorithm 8, 9, and 10.
Note that Line 13 in Algorithm 9 requires exponential computation. The proof
is similar to the ones for H-BRB[3f+1].
Algorithm 8 EC-BRB[3f+1]: source s with message m of index h
1: function Reliable-Broadcast(m,h)
2: {c1, c2, . . . , cn} = ENC(m)
3: Send(MSG, s,H(m), ck, h) to node k
The downside is that EC-BRB[3f+1] requires exponential computation. That
is, it needs to find out the correct f + 1 coded elements to decode, which re-
quires O(
(
n
f+1
)
) computation. When f is small, the computation is negligible.
However, the scalability is limited.
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Algorithm 9 EC-BRB[3f+1]: all node i (including s) when receiving a message
from node j
1: function Receiving(MSG, s,H, c, h)
2: if j = s and first (MSG, s, ∗, ∗, h) then
3: CodeSet[s,H, h]← CodeSet[s, h,H] ∪ {c}
4: Counter[ECHO, s,H, h] + +
5: if never sent (ECHO, s, ∗, h) then
6: Send(ECHO, s,H, c, h) to all nodes
7: function Receiving(ECHO, s,H, c, h)
8: if first (ECHO, s, ∗, ∗, h) from j then
9: Counter[ECHO, s,H, h] + +
10: CodeSet[s,H, h]← CodeSet[s, h,H] ∪ {c}
11: if Counter[ECHO, s,H, h] ≥ f + 1 then
12: if 6 ∃m ∈ MsgSet[s, h] s.t. H(m) = H then
13: for each C ⊆ CodeSet[s,H, j], |C| = f + 1 do
14: m← DEC(C)
15: if H(m) = H then
16: MsgSet[s, h]← MsgSet[s, h] ∪ {m}
17: Check(s,H, h)
18: function Receiving(ACC, s,H, h)
19: if first (ACC, s, ∗, h) from j then
20: Counter[ACC, s,H, h] + +
21: if Counter[ACC, s,H, h] ≥ f + 1 then
22: if 6 ∃m′ ∈ MsgSet[s, h] s.t. H(m′) = H then
23: Send (REQ, s,H, h) to nodes if have not sent (REQ, s,H, h)
to them before
24: Check(j,H, h)
25: function Receiving(REQ, s,H, h)
26: if first (REQ, s, h) from j then
27: if ∃m′ ∈ MsgSet[s, h] s.t. H(m′) = H then
28: Send (FWD, s,m′, h) to j
29: function Receiving(FWD, s,m, h)
30: if have sent (REQ, s,H(m), h) to j then
31: if first (FWD, s,m, h) from j then
32: MsgSet[s, h]← MsgSet[s, h] ∪ {m}
33: Check(s,H(m), h)
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Algorithm 10 EC-BRB[3f+1]: helper function for all node i (including s)
1: function Check(s,H, h)
2: if m ∈ MsgSet[s, h] s.t. H(m) = H then
3: if Counter[ECHO, s,H, h] ≥ f + 1 then
4: if never sent (ECHO, s, ∗, ∗, h) then
5: {c1, . . . , cn} ← ENC(m)
6: Send (ECHO, s,H, ci, h) to all nodes
7: if Counter[ECHO, s,H, h] ≥ n− f then
8: if never sent (ACC, s, ∗, h) then
9: Send (ACC, s,H, h) to all nodes
10: if Counter[ACC, s,H, h] ≥ f + 1 then
11: if never sent (ACC, s, ∗, h) then
12: Send (ACC, s,H, h) to all nodes
13: if Counter[ACC, s,H, h] ≥ n− f then
14: Reliable-Accept(s,m, h)
5.3 EC-BRB[4f+1]
To fix the scalability issue, we rely on the correction capability of MDS code.
Unfortunately, we have to sacrifice the resilience, and the algorithm only works
when n ≥ 4f + 1. This trade-off turns out is necessary, as formally discussed in
Section 6.
Error-correcting MDS Codes
In our setup, we will use [n, k] MDS code for
k = n− 3f
In other words, the distance between different codewords is d = n−k+1 = 3f+1.
Our algorithm will rely on the following theorems from coding theory.
Theorem 11. The decoder function DEC can correctly decode the original
message if the input contains at least n − f coded elements and among these
used elements, up to f may be erroneous.
Theorem 12. Assume n ≥ 4f + 1. Consider codeword C =
{c1, c2, . . . , cn} and codeword C ′ = {c′1, c′2, . . . , c′n} such that (i) C has at most
f erasures, (ii) C ′ has at most f erasures,1 and (iii) at most f of the remaining
coded elements are different between the two codewords. If DEC(C) = m, then
DEC(C ′) either returns m or detects an error.
Note that Theorem 12 does not work for n ≤ 4f . This is because by con-
struction, each pair of codewords has distance 3f + 1. Therefore if the source is
faulty, it is possible to find a scenario that DEC(C) = m and DEC(C ′) = m′
for m′ 6= m if n ≤ 4f .
1Erasures at C and C′ may occur at different positions.
15
EC-BRB[4f+1]: Algorithm
We present the peudo-code in Algorithms 12, 13, and 1. The structure is similar
to before. The key difference is that upon receiving the ECHO messages, each
node uses decoder function to recover the original message m. If the source is
non-faulty, then the error-correcting feature of MDS code trivially handles the
corrupted coded element forwarded by other faulty nodes.
The key challenge is to handle the colluding behaviors from Byzantine source
and other nodes. For example, it is possible that some non-faulty node can
correctly construct a message, but other non-faulty nodes are not able to. This
is the reason that we need to have codeword distance at least 3f .
Another aspect is that we use a plain RB, say Bracha’s RB [8] protocol,
to reliably broadcast H(m). This guarantees even if the source is faulty, non-
faulty nodes cannot decode different values. Since H(m) is a constant, it does
not affect the overall bit complexity.
One interesting aspect is that the MDS code part takes care of some tedious
check, so the logic in Algorithm 13 is actually simpler. In particular, we do not
need the rules for handling ECHO messages.
Algorithm 11 EC-BRB[4f+1]: source s with message m of index h
1: function Reliable-Broadcast(m,h)
2: Reliable-Broadcast(HashTag|H(m), h)
3: {c1, c2, . . . , cn} = ENC(m)
4: Send(MSG, s, ck, h) to node k
EC-BRB[4f+1]: Correctness
We present proof sketch of the following theorem.
Theorem 13. H-BRB[4f+1] satisfies Property 1-5 given that n ≥ 4f + 1.
Property 1 (Non-faulty Broadcast Termination) is similar to before. The
only two new aspects are: (i) non-faulty nodes will eventually be able to reliably
accept H(m); and (ii) message m can be correctly constructed. (i) is due to the
property of Bracha’s protocol, and (ii) is due to the feature of MDS code.
Property 2 (Validity) and Property 4 (Integrity) can be proved similar, which
are essentially due to the n− f threshold at Line 9 and f + 1 threshold at Line
19 of Algorithm 2.
Now, we show that EC-BRB[4f+1] satisfies Property 3 (Agreement). For a
given s, h, suppose by way of contradiction, two non-faulty nodes a and b reliably
accept two values va and vb, respectively. Suppose va 6= vb. This means that
Counter[ACC, s,H(va), h] ≥ n − f at node a and Counter[ACC, s,H(vb), h] ≥
n−f at node b. By construction, each node only sends ACC message once. This
means that we have 2(n−f)−n ≥ n−2f ≥ f +1 nodes that send contradicting
ACC messages, a contradiction.
Finally, we prove the following lemma.
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Algorithm 12 EC-BRB[4f+1]: all node i (including s) when receiving a mes-
sage from node j
1: function Receiving(MSG, s, c, h)
2: if j = s and first (MSG, s, ∗, h) then
3: CodeSet[s, h]← CodeSet[s, h] ∪ {c}
4: if never sent (ECHO, s, ∗, h) then
5: Send(ECHO, s, c, h) to all nodes
6: function Receiving(ECHO, s, c, h)
7: if first (ECHO, s, ∗, h) from j then
8: CodeSet[s, h]← CodeSet[s, h] ∪ {c}
9: if |CodeSet[s, h]| ≥ n− f then
10: m← DEC(CodeSet[s, h])
11: if m 6= ERROR then
12: MsgSet[s, h]← MsgSet[s, h] ∪ {m}
13: wait until ∃x ∈ HashSet[s, h] s.t. x = H(m)
. successful decoding
14: if never sent (ACC, s, ∗, h) before then
15: Send(ACC, s,H(m), h) to all nodes
16: function Receiving(ACC, s, x, h)
17: if first (ACC, s, ∗, h) from j′ then
18: Counter[ACC, s, x, h] + +
19: if Counter[ACC, s, x, h] = f + 1, and
20: never sent (ACC, s, ∗, h) before then
21: Send(ACC, s, x, h) to all nodes
22: Check(s, h)
23: function Receiving(REQ, s, x, h)
24: if first (REQ, s, x, h) from j then
25: if ∃m ∈ MsgSet[s, h] s.t. H(m) = x then
26: Send (FWD, s,m,H(m), h) to j
27: function Receiving(FWD, j,m, x, h)
28: if have sent (REQ, j, x, h) to j′ then
29: if first (FWD, j,m, x, h) from j′, and H(m) = x then
30: MsgSet[j, h]← MsgSet[j, h] ∪ {m}
31: Check(j, h)
32: function Reliable-Accepting(HashTag|H ′, h) from source j
33: HashSet[j, h]← HashSet[j, h] ∪ {H ′}
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Algorithm 13 EC-BRB[4f+1]: helper function for all node i (including s)
1: function Check(s, h)
2: if ∃x ∈ HashSet[s, h] s.t.
3: Counter[ACC, s, x, h] ≥ n− f then
4: if ∃m ∈ MsgSet[s, h] s.t. H(m) = x then
5: Reliable-Accept(s,m, h)
6: else
7: Send (REQ, s,H(m), h) to these n− f nodes
Lemma 14. EC-BRB[4f+1] satisfies Property 5 (Eventual Termination).
Proof. Suppose a non-faulty node u reliable-accept(s,m, h), which means
it has Counter[ACC, s, x, h] ≥ n − f and ∃x ∈ HashSet[s, h] s.t. x = H(m).
Therefore, all the other non-faulty nodes would have Counter[ACC, s, x, h] ≥
n− 2f ≥ f + 1 and eventually reliably accept x.
Theorem 12 implies that it is impossible for a non-faulty node i to decode
a message m′ 6= m in round h for source s. Therefore, we have the following
claim.
Claim 15. If two non-faulty nodes i and j sends (ACC, s,H(m), h) and (ACC, s,H(m′), h)
messages, respectively, then m = m′.
Line 19 of Algorithm 12 and Claim 15 ensure that all non-faulty nodes will
eventually send an ACC message advocating x = H(m). Therefore, eventually
Counter[ACC, s, x, h] ≥ n − f at every non-faulty node. At that point, each
non-faulty node will either request a value from a set of nodes, particularly from
u, or have collected enough correct coded elements to decode the value m.
5.4 Discussion
It is natural to ask whether it is possible to have an algorithm that does not
require exponential local computation or flooding of the original message, and
requires only 3f + 1 nodes. We briefly discuss why such an algorithm is difficult
to design, if not impossible. EC-BRB[4f+1] requires at least 4f + 1 nodes, as
we require codeword distance to be 3f + 1. It is because that when n = 4f , the
adversary (including equivocating source) is able to force a group of non-faulty
nodes to decode A and the other to decode B 6= A, which defeats the purpose
of using error-correcting code. Essentially, this creates the split-brain problem.
Similarly, if we use codeword distance less than or equal to 3f . Then it is again
possible to force two group of non-faulty nodes to decode different values. In
other words, techniques other than error-correcting codes need to be used to
address this issue.
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6 Impossibility Results
6.1 Preliminaries
To facilitate the discussion of our impossibility proof, we introduce formalized
definition of our systems and useful notions such as time, execution, and phase.
Note that these notions are well studied in the distributed computing litera-
ture [30, 3]. We include them here for completeness.
The system is made up of a finite, non-empty static set Π of n asynchronous
nodes, of which at most f maybe Byzantine faulty. An asynchronous node can
be modeled as a state machine with a set of states S. Every node p starts at
some initial state sip ∈ S. We consider event-driven protocols. That is, state
transitions are triggered by the occurrences of events. Possible triggering events
for node p are: Reliable-Broadcast request (Reliable-Broadcastp) and re-
ceiving a message (Receivingp). A step of a node p is a 5-tuple (s, T,m,R, s
′)
where s is the old state, T is the triggering event, m is the message to be sent,
R is a response (Sendp and Reliable-Acceptp) or ⊥, and s′ is the new state.
The values of m, R and s′ are determined by a transition function2 applied to
s and T . The response to Reliable-Broadcast is Sendp, and the response
to Receivingp is either Sendp or Reliable-Acceptp. If the values of m, R,
and s′ are determined by the node’s transition function applied to s and T , then
the step is said to be valid. In an invalid step (taken by Byzantine node), the
values of m, R, and s′ can be arbitrary.
A view of a node is a sequence of steps such that: (i) the old state of the
first step is an initial state; (ii) the new state of each step equals the old state
of the next step. A point in time is represented by a non-negative real number.
A timed view is a view whose steps occur at non-decreasing times. If a view is
infinite, the times at which its steps occur must increase without bound. If a
message m sent at time t is received by a node at time t′, then the delay of this
message is t′ − t. This encompasses transmission delay as well as time for for
handling the message at both the sender and receiver.
An execution e is a possibly infinite set of timed views, one for each node
that is present in the system, that satisfies the following assumptions:
1. Every message Send has at most one matching Receive at the receiv-
ing node and every message Receive has exactly one matching message
Send.
2. If a non-faulty node p Send’s message m to a non-faulty node q at time
t, then q Receive’s message m at finite time t′ ≥ t
An execution is said to be legal if at least n−f timed views in the execution are
valid. We consider an algorithm to be correct if every execution of the algorithm
satisfies properties 1 to 5 in Section 2.2.
Now, we introduce some notions with respect to the broadcast problem on
any execution prefix e:
2The transition function is determined by the protocol or algorithm
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• The maximum message delay in any execution prefix e is called the phase.
• If a node p hears about a message directly from the sender, it is a direct
witness. The sender of a message is also a direct witness.
• A witness(m) message is a message sent by a node p announcing that p
has either received m directly from the sender or heard of f + 1 nodes
that have sent witness(m) messages supporting m. The sender can also
send out witness(m) messages. Nodes send out witness messages to them-
selves as well. We assume that all witness messages that other than the
constant size helper messages (in Section 4) contain the original message
piggybacked onto it.
• Node p is an indirect witness of message m, if p hears of at least f + 1
witness(m) messages.
• A helper(m) message is a constant sized messages created from some ar-
bitrary function f(m). In the sections above, the hash function is used to
create helper messages.
In reliable broadcast algorithms presented in this paper and other prior
implementations [8, 37, 22], witness(m) messages can be in the form of Echo,
Ready, Accept, etc. For our impossibility proofs, we consider the family of
algorithms in which when nodes become a witness to some message (m,h), they
have to send out a witness message supporting (∗, h). Since we consider an
asynchronous system, nodes do not have the capability to measure time and
thus the algorithm is event-driven. That is, the algorithm logic has to be based
on waiting for a certain number of messages before making a decision.
For all event-driven witness-based algorithms, the following observation ap-
plies. The reason is that Byzantine nodes can choose not to send out witness
messages, and if an algorithm needs to wait for more than n−f witness messages
to proceed, then a non-faulty node could never make progress.
Observation 16. A node cannot wait for > n−f witness messages for message
m to reliably deliver m.
6.2 Impossibility: Byzantine RB in 2 phases
For Lemmas 17 and 18 and Theorem 19, consider a system Π of size |Π| = n =
5f , composed of node sets S1, S2, S3, S4 and B. Each of these sets is of size
f , i.e., |S1| = |S2| = · · · = |B| = f . Assume set B to be the set of Byzantine
faulty nodes. For all the proofs below we consider an execution prefix and the
maximum message delay or phase in each prefix is considered to be 1 time unit.
Note that in these proofs, all messages (unless mentioned otherwise) have a
fixed message delay of 1 unit of time. In this case, by definition, phase r refers
to the time interval [r, r + 1).
Lemma 17. A node must wait for ≥ bn+f2 c+ 1 witness messages for message
m, to reliably deliver m.
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Proof. Assume by contradiction Algorithm A reliably delivers message m at
node p after receiving bn+f2 c witness(m) messages at p.
We now consider a scenario where Property 3 (Agreement) is violated. Node
b ∈ B equivocates and sends out message m1 to nodes in set S1∪S2 and message
m2 to nodes in S3∪S4, associated with index h. Each non-faulty node sends out
a witness message as per the message received from b with index h. Since the
sender b is also a direct witness, it is allowed to send out witness messages. All
the Byzantine nodes in B including node b equivocate and send out witness(m1)
to the nodes in S1 ∪ S2 and witness(m2) to the nodes in S3 ∪ S4. As a result,
nodes in S1 ∪ S2 get 3f , witness(m1) messages and 2f, witness(m2) messages
and nodes in S3∪S4 get 3f witness(m2) messages and 2f witness(m1) messages.
Note that in this system, bn+f2 c = b 5f+f2 c = 3f . By the statement of the
lemma, nodes wait for only 3f witness(m) messages to deliver any message m.
Thus nodes in S1 ∪S2 deliver message m1 and nodes in S3 ∪S4 deliver message
m2 with respect to index h, violating Property 3 (Agreement).
Lemma 18. If non-faulty nodes send contradicting witness messages corre-
sponding to a message with index h, Property 3 (Agreement) is violated.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume Algorithm A ensures reliable
broadcast. Consider a prefix of an execution we term Exec-1 as follows.
Exec-1:
• Phase r: Assume node b ∈ B sends message m1 to nodes in S1 and
message m2(6= m1) to node S4 in phase r. Nodes in S1 and S4 hear about
messages m1 and m2 respectively before the beginning of the next phase.
• Phase r + 1: In this phase, the following messages are sent out.
Byzantine nodes in B:
1. All the nodes in B send out witness(m1) to nodes in S1 and witness(m2)
to nodes in S2.
2. Node b ∈ B sends out witness(m1) to all nodes in S2 ∪ S3. These
witness messages are fast and take time t′  1 and reach the nodes
in S2 ∪ S3 at time (r + 1) + t′.
3. Nodes B − {b} send out witness(m2) messages to all nodes in S2 ∪
S3. These messages are also fast but slower than the witness(m1)
messages sent by b and take 2 · t′ time units where, and reach the
nodes in S2 ∪ S3 at time (r + 1) + 2t′. Note that 2 · t′  1.
Nodes in S1:
Nodes in S1 send out witness(m1) message to all nodes. These messages
are very fast and take time t′  1 and reach the nodes in S2 ∪ S3 at time
(r + 1) + t′.
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Nodes in S4:
Nodes in S4 send out witness(m2) messages to all nodes. These messages
are fast but slower than the witness(m1) messages sent by nodes in S1
and take 2 · t′ time units; where, 2 · t′  1.
Nodes in S2 ∪ S3:
Consider the time interval [r+1+ t′, r+1+2 · t′]. At time r+1+ t′, these
nodes receive f + 1 messages in the form of witness(m1), and become
indirect witnesses for message m1. As a result they send out witness(m1)
messages to everyone. The messages to the nodes in S1 are very fast and
have a delay of t′  1 time units but reach everyone else slowly, with a
delay of 1 time unit.
At time r + 1 + 2t′, nodes in S2 ∪ S3 receive 2f − 1 messages of the form
witness(m2) from nodes in S4 ∪B − {b}. At this point, these nodes also
become indirect witnesses for message m2 and send out witness messages
of the form witness(m2) to everyone. By the assumption on Algorithm
A, this is legal and the prefix of the execution is still valid. These witness
messages are fast (delay = t′) and reach all nodes by time r + 1 + 3t′.
• Phase r + 2:
By time r + 2, all nodes in S1 have received n− f witness(m1) messages
from B∪S1∪S2∪S3 and all nodes in S4 have received n−f witness(m2)
messages from S2 ∪ S3 ∪ S4 ∪ B. By Observation 16, nodes in S1 and S4
cannot wait for more witness messages and thus deliver messages m1 and
m2, respectively, violating Property 3 (Agreement).
Thus a non faulty node may not send out contradicting witness messages for
any given message index.
Theorem 19. It is impossible to guarantee reliable broadcast in 2 phases of
communication after a non-faulty node hears about a broadcast message.
Proof. We do a proof by contradiction. Assume Algorithm A ensures reliable
broadcast in 2 phases of communication after a non-faulty node hears about this
message. Recall that all messages have a delay of 1 time unit unless otherwise
mentioned and phase r refers to the time interval [r, r + 1). Consider a prefix
of an execution we term Exec-2 as follows.
Exec-2:
• Phase r: Let b ∈ B equivocate and send a message m1 to nodes in S1
and message m2(6= m1) to nodes in S2 in phase r. Nodes in S1 and S2 are
direct witnesses before the beginning of the next phase.
• Phase r + 1:
Nodes in B collude and send contradicting witness messages as follows:
witness(m1) to nodes in S1 ∪ S3 ∪ S4 and witness(m2) to nodes in S2.
Nodes in S3 ∪ S4 do nothing.
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Lemma 18 shows that, nodes cannot be witnesses to more than one mes-
sage per sender as this will violate Property 3 (Agreement). As a result
nodes in S1 only send witness(m1) message to all nodes, and nodes in S2
only send witness(m2) message to all nodes.
• Phase r + 2:
Nodes in S3 ∪ S4 send out witness(m1) messages to all nodes as they are
indirect witnesses to message m1.
By the correctness of A and our assumption at the beginning of the proof,
all nodes reliably deliver a message, either m1 or m2 by the end of this
phase. WLOG, let the message that each node delivers is m1. Thus all
nodes should have received at least (n + f)/2 + 1 = 3f + 1 witness(m1)
messages (from Lemma 17) and at most n−f = 4f witness(m1) messages
(from Observation 16) before reliably delivering it.
However, by the end of phase r+ 2, any node s2 ∈ S2 ends up not getting
≥ 3f + 1 messages supporting either m1 or m2. Node s2 receives at most
2f witness(m2) messages (from B and S2) and at most 3f witness(m1)
messages (from S1 ∪ S3 ∪ S4) by the end of phase r + 2.
Node s2 thus has to wait on 2f more witness(m2) messages or f more
witness(m1) messages to satisfy the sufficiency condition in Observa-
tion 16, which do not arrive after at the end of phase r + 2.
This violates Property 5 (Eventual Termination).
6.3 Impossibility of Byzantine RB using constant-size helper
messages in 4 phases
Here, we consider algorithms where the non-source sends out constant-size helper
messages to ensure reliable broadcast except when a receiving node specifically
requests for the original message. A node j does not send out requests for the
original message until it is absolutely sure that at least one non-faulty node has
reliably delivered a message m associated with some tag h different from the
message (m′, h), j has received. Note that j might not even have received m′,
i.e., m′ =⊥.
Theorem 20. For n ≤ 5f + 1, it is impossible to guarantee reliable broadcast
in 4 phases of communication if using constant sized helper messages, once a
non-faulty node hears about a broadcast message .
Proof. Assume a system with size n = 6 containing nodes {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, b} where
node b is byzantine faulty. Consider the following execution:
• Phase r: Node b performs a Reliable-Broadcast of message (m,h) to all
nodes. However, it equivocates and sends (m′, h) to node 1 and (m,h) to
the others.
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• Phase r+ 1: Since we are considering algorithms that send out messages
of constant size for non-senders, unless specifically requested, node 1 sends
out helper(m′) messages for m′ and nodes {2, 3, 4, 5} send out helper(m)
messages for m. Node b equivocates again and sends out helper(m′) to
node 1 and helper(m) to all others.
• Phase 2: Nodes 2, 4, 4, 5 have now heard helper(m) messages supporting
m from 5 = n−f nodes. We know from Observation 16, that a node cannot
wait for more messages to reliably deliver a message. Thus these four nodes
reliably deliver m and send out helper messages of acceptance. Node 1
has heard of only one original message m′ and helper(m) messages about
message m 6= m′. Thus it is unable to deliver any message associated with
the tag h at this moment. Note that this is the first round when node 1
hears about the existence of a message different from m′ associated with
tag number h.
• Phase r + 3: Node 1 hears of accept messages from n − 2f nodes (from
2, 3, 4, 5) about a message m 6= m′. Thus, since more than f nodes have
accepted a different message that node 1 has not received yet, node 1 sends
out a request for the original message to any f + 1 nodes that sent out
the accept messages. WLOG, let node 1 send request messages to nodes
2 and 3.
• Phase r+4: Nodes 2 and 3 send out the original messages as a response to
1’s request. Node 1 is still unable to reliably deliver any message associated
with the tag h.
This violates Property 5 (Eventual Termination) in Section 2.2.
In the next phase r + 5, node 1 sends out a decision to accept the original
message m after receiving it from nodes 2 and 3. Thus in phase r + 5 node 1
finally reliably delivers m.
7 Evaluation
We evaluate the performances of RB protocols through simulations over re-
alistic environments. We design and implement a configurable and extensible
benchmarking platform for reliable protocols over asynchronous message-passing
networks, Reliability Mininet Benchmark (RMB). In particular, RMB is appro-
priate for evaluating protocols over networks within a datacenter or a cluster.
In this section, we describe the framework, including its features and parame-
ters first, then report performance numbers of the proposed protocols and some
prior algorithms using RMB.
7.1 The Architecture of RMB
RMB is built on top of Mininet [26, 20], and tailored toward the generic ab-
straction for distributed algorithms depicted in Figure 1. The architecture of
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RMB is presented in Figure 2. The application in RMB is a workload genera-
tor that generate reliable broadcast requests and collect and report statistics.
The protocol layer contains the RB protocols that we implement. RMB is ex-
tensible in the sense that as long as the protocol implementation follows the
pre-defined interface, the implementation can be evaluated using RMB. Finally,
the network layer is simulated by Mininet and the network manager that we
implement. RMB users can easily use the script we provide to configure the
network conditions, e.g., delay, jitter, bandwidth, etc. By design, RMB com-
ponents (application, protocol, and network) are run in separate processes, and
the entire RMB is simulated on a single machine using Mininet. The layers are
implemented using Go3 and we provide Python scripts to launch RMB.
Network parameters can be easily configured within a single YAML file.
Benchmark managers and protocols are invoked by a Python script after the
network is initialized. Advanced users can also program a topology and try
various link parameters. A key benefit of RMB is to free user from tedious work
of configuring environments (regarding networks and computation power) and
faulty behaviors.
7.2 RMB Benchmark Workflow
RMB first reads network parameters in a configuration YAML file to create a
Mininet network with a preset topology (one of SingleSwitchTopo, LinearTopo,
TreeTopo, and FatTreeTopo, or a user-defined one), with the desired number of
hosts (with CPU limit or not) and types of links (e.g., with different artificial
delay, packet jitters, bandwidth constraints).
We have programmed reliable broadcast protocols mentioned in previous
sections with respect to the benchmark manager’s interface. After specifying
binary files of these two programs and filling in parameters required by them in
the YAML file, a user of RMB can starts all three layers of RMB with a single
command (that fires up the Python script). After a round of simulation is
complete, each benchmark manager would generate statistics that can be later
analyzed and graphed through analytical scripts of RMB.
Figure 2: The architecture of RMB
3https://golang.org/
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Mininet
The bottom layer (gray boxes in figure 2) is a virtualized network, created by
Mininet [26, 20]. Mininet is a battle-tested software that is widely used in pro-
totyping Software-Defined Networks (SDNs). Our python starts-up script calls
the Mininet library to start a virtual network consist of hosts, links, switches
and a controller before the start of simulation. A virtual host emulates a node in
a networked computing cluster, but in essence, it is a shell in a network names-
pace. Other three layers of RMB are Linux applications that run on each host
inside Mininet. Hosts do not communicate with each other directly, instead,
they connect to virtual switches through Mininet links (Linux virtual Ethernet
device pairs). The switches are also connected through links, if there are more
than one. These controller and switches together make a good emulation of
hardware in a real-world network.
We choose to use virtualized network owing to several benefits, including
scalability (e.g., no limit on number of ports for a virtual switch), almost-zero
setup time (i.e., a command can start the entire network), fine-grained control
over network artifacts (e.g., delay and jitter), and no concern with network
bandwidth fluctuations.
Manager Layer
We have one (network) manager for each host is to manage data communication
between protocol layer and other hosts in the network. There are four go rou-
tines for separate responsibilities: (i) receiving message from the protocol layer,
(ii) receiving message from other hosts, (iii) sending to protocol layer, and (iv)
sending message to other hosts. Another responsibility is to control the faulty
behavior if the current node is configured to be Byzantine node, e.g., randomly
corrupt messages.
Protocol Layer (RB Algorithms)
The middle layer implements the RB protocols we want to evaluate. Each
instance is paired up with a manager we discussed above, and thus does not
need to know explicitly the existence of other manager/protocol instances. Such
a design choice allows researchers to implement new protocols and benchmark
them at ease. In our RB protocols, there are two go routines in this layer.
One is responsible for sending message to the manager layer, and the other one
is responsible for reading messages from the manager layer and then perform
corresponding action. That is, we implemented an event-driven algorithm as in
our pseudo-code. Note that we make minimal assumption in this layer; hence,
potentially, future RMB users can implemented in their favorite programming
language and the algorithms do not have to be event-driven. For the hash
function, we used Golang default package hmac5124, and open source Golang
erasure coding package written by klauspost 5.
4https://golang.org/pkg/crypto/hmac/
5https://github.com/klauspost/reedsolomon
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Application Layer (Workload Generator)
The top layer implements the workload generator in RMB. There are two roles:
(i) issue reliable-broadcast commands following a specified workload (e.g., size,
frequency), and (ii) collect and calculate statistics (latency and throughput).
7.3 Performance Evaluation
Simulation Setup
We perform the performance evaluation using RMB on a single virtual machine
(VM), equipped with 24 vCPU and 48 GB memory on Google Cloud Platform
(GCP). Ubuntu 18.04.4 LTS (Bionic Beaver) runs on the VM as the OS. When
no network artifact is specified, the default RTT in a Mininet emulated topology,
from a host to another, is between 0.06 ms to 0.08 ms.
In the evaluation below, we do not present the result for Patra’s algorithm
[34], which has optimal complexity O(nL). The reason is its high computation
complexity. It requires roughly 400 ms to complete for a network of 32 nodes,
which makes it much slower than the other protocols we test.
Evaluation: Topology and Bandwidth Constraints
RMB allows us to easily evaluate our algorithms in different topology and band-
width constraints. We test in three different network topologies with n = 5 and
f = 0: (i) Linear topology : 5 switches with one host per switch; (ii) Tree topol-
ogy : tree depth = 3, and fan-out = 2; and (iii) Fat Tree topology : 5 edges, with
each host per edge.
For each data point, the source performs RB 2, 000 times with message size
1, 024 bytes. We record the throughput, calculated as the number of reliable-
accept per seconds. We have test our Hash- and EC-BRB’s and Bracha’s RB
[8]. We also test a non-fault-tolerant broadcast (denoted as Broadcast in the
table) as a baseline. In Broadcast, the source simply performs n unicasts, and
each node accepts a message when it receives anything from source. It provides
the highest performance and no fault-tolerance.
The results are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4. It is clear that each algo-
rithms perform differently in different topology, but it is difficult to observe a
meaningful pattern. This is also why we believe RMB is of interests for practi-
tioners. It provides a lightweight evaluation for different protocols in different
scenarios.
One interesting pattern is that with limited bandwidth, our algorithms out-
performs Bracha’s except for EC-BRB[3f+1] in certain scenarios due to high
computation cost. Moreover, H-BRB[3f+1] are within 50% of Broadcast’s per-
formance.
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Algorithm Bandwidth(Mbits/s) Throughput
H-BRB[3f+1] unlimited 1041
EC-BRB[3f+1] unlimited 1047
EC-BRB[4f+1] unlimited 967
Broadcast unlimited 16303
Bracha unlimited 4604
H-BRB[3f+1] 42 746
EC-BRB[3f+1] 42 301
EC-BRB[4f+1] 42 426
Broadcast 42 1131
Bracha 42 338
Table 2: Linear Topology
Algorithm Bandwidth(Mbits/s) Throughput
H-BRB[3f+1] unlimited 1117
EC-BRB[3f+1] unlimited 1152
EC-BRB[4f+1] unlimited 965
Broadcast unlimited 14604
Bracha unlimited 4521
H-BRB[3f+1] 42 699
EC-BRB[3f+1] 42 301
EC-BRB[4f+1] 42 414
Broadcast 42 1139
Bracha 42 334
Table 3: Tree Topology
Synchrony vs. Asynchrony
Even though synchronous Byzantine agreement protocols do not work in asyn-
chrony in general, they serve as a good baseline.6 In Table 5, we compare our
algorithms with NCBA and Digest from [27]. NCBA is an erasure-coding based
algorithm, whereas Digest is a hash-based algorithm. Both do not work if a
node may crash fail in an asynchronous network. In this set of experiment, we
adopt the topology of a single switch, n = 4, message size 1024 bytes, and 2, 000
reliable broadcasts.
Interestingly, the performances are close. H-BRB[3f+1] even beats the two
synchronous algorithms by around 20%. Note that in our implementation, we
favor NCBA and Digest by skipping the expensive dispute control phase.
6Some might adapt synchronous algorithms to work in a practical setting. For example,
in [27], it is argued that the proposed synchronous algorithms are appropriate in a datacenter
setting.
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Algorithm Bandwidth(Mbits/s) Throughput
H-BRB[3f+1] unlimited 1490
EC-BRB[3f+1] unlimited 1072
EC-BRB[4f+1] unlimited 772
Broadcast unlimited 16080
Bracha unlimited 4216
H-BRB[3f+1] 42 754
EC-BRB[3f+1] 42 370
EC-BRB[4f+1] 42 532
Broadcast 42 1141
Bracha 42 518
Table 4: Fat Tree Topology
Algorithm Throughput
H-BRB[3f+1] 2038
EC-BRB[3f+1] 1411
EC-BRB[4f+1] 1295
Digest 1674
NCBA 1601
Table 5: Synchronous vs Asynchronous
Hash or EC?
In the final set of experiments, we provide guidance on how to pick the best
algorithms given the application scenario. We use the single switch topology,
n = 20, and 100 rounds of reliable broadcasts. Each experiment has the config-
uration below:
• Exp1: f = 4, source’s bandwidth limitation = 50 KBytes/s, message size
= 1096 bytes.
• Exp2: f = 4, source’s bandwidth limitation = 500 KBytes/s, message size
= 1096 bytes.
• Exp3: f = 1, source’s bandwidth limitation = 50 KBytes/s, message size
= 1020 bytes.
• Exp4: f = 1, source’s bandwidth limitation = 500 KBytes/s, message size
= 1020 bytes.
The result is presented in Table 6. The numbers follow the theoretical anal-
ysis: (i) H-BRB does not perform well with limited source’s bandwidth; (ii)
EC-BRB[3f+1] performs better with larger f ; and (iii) EC-BRB[4f+1] performs
better with smaller f .
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H-BRB[3f+1] EC-BRB[3f+1] EC-BRB[4f+1]
exp1 1.6 2.5 1.2
exp2 19 7 1.2
exp3 1.6 1.3 2.3
exp4 19.3 12.6 16
Table 6: Hash vs. EC
8 Related Work
Reliable broadcast has been studied in the context of Byzantine failures since
the eighties [8, 6, 10, 18]. Bracha [8] proposed a clean RB protocol. Birman and
Joseph [6] introduce a multicast and broadcast protocol that enforces causal
delivery in the crash-recovery model. Chang and Maxemchuk [10] designed
a family of reliable broadcast protocols with tradeoffs between the number of
helper (low level) messages per high level broadcast message, the local storage
requirements, and the fault-tolerance of the system. Eugster et al. [16] present
a probabilistic gossip-based broadcast algorithm, which is lightweight and scal-
able in terms of throughput and memory management. Guerraoui et al. [19]
generalize the Byzantine reliable broadcast abstraction to the probabilistic set-
ting, allowing each of the properties to be violated with a small probability to
attain logarithmic per-node communication and computation complexity. Lou
and Wu [29] introduce double-covered broadcast (DCB), to improve the perfor-
mance of reliable broadcast in Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) by taking
advantage of broadcast redundancy to improve the delivery ratio even in systems
with high transmission error rate. Pagourtzis et al. [33] study the Byzantine-
tolerant Reliable Broadcast problem under the locally bounded adversary model
and the general adversary model and explore the tradeoff between the level of
topology knowledge and the solvability of the problem. Raynal [37] provides a
detailed history of how the reliable broadcast abstraction has evolved since the
eighties. He also illustrates the importance of reliable broadcast in systems with
crash and Byzantine failures. A survey of existing reliable broadcast mechanism
can be found in [12, 5]. Bonomi et al. [7] implement Byzantine-tolerant reliable
broadcast in multi-hop networks connected by cannels that are not authenti-
cate and improve previous bounds while preserving both the safety and liveness
properties of the original definitions [13].
In recent years there have been several attempts at implementing reliable
broadcast more efficiently [28, 35, 34, 27, 14, 24]. Jeanneau et al. [24] perform
crash-tolerant reliable broadcast in a wait-free system (f ≤ n−1) equipped with
a failure detector. Messages are transmitted over spanning trees that are built
dynamically on top of a logical hierarchical hypercube-like topology built based
on failure detectors providing logarithmic guarantees on latency and number
of messages disseminated. Liang et al. [27] compare the performance of sev-
eral synchronous Byzantine agreement algorithms NCBA and Digest. Fitzi and
Hirt [17] present a synchronous RB protocol where the message is broadcast
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only n times compared to prior implementations that use n2 broadcasts. Pa-
tra [34] presents an algorithm for Byzantine RB with optimal resilience and
bit complexity O(nL). In [35], Patra and Rangan reported similar results that
were only problematically correct. Choudhury [11] achieves Byzantine-tolerant
reliable broadcast with just majority correctness whilst maintaining optimal bit
complexity of O(nL), using a non-equivocation mechanism provided by hard-
ware.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we present a family of reliable broadcast algorithms that tolerate
faults ranging from crashes to Byzantine ones that are suited to bandwidth
constrained networks using cryptographic hash functions and erasure codes. We
provide theoretical algorithms, experimental results and impossibility proofs to
state our case. We hope this paper will provide guidance and reference for
practitioners that work on fault-tolerant distributed systems and use reliable
broadcast as a primitive.
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